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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
CaseNo20021072-CA
vs.
TERRY J. STEPHENSON AND
GRANT MILLS,
Defendants and Appellants.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e)
(1996) and Utah R. App. P. 3(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Issue: Whether proceedings before Judge Harding, if he were
under the influence of, or materially impaired by, the use of
cocaine and heroin, would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate
due process under the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the
United States.
Issue: Whether the Court incorrectly ruled that the defendant is
not entitled to conduct discovery to determine the scope, duration,
extent and nature of the alleged use of cocaine and heroin by
Judge Harding when he was considering Defendant's case.
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Standard of Review: The foregoing issues may present mixed
questions of fact and law to be analyzed pursuant to State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932,936-40 (Utah 1994).
Appellate courts review factual questions under the clearly erroneous
standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. Jeffs v. Stubbs,
970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
Preservation: The foregoing issues were addressed in a Motion for
Review and Reversal of the Honorable Ray M. Harding Jr.' Rulings on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Suppress, Motion Requesting
Findings of Fact, and for Stay of all Further Proceedings Pending a
Disposition of the Motion filed by the Defendant and Appellant, Terry J.
Stephenson, (Terry) (R. 861) and his memorandum in support thereof. (R.
883).
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that a criminal
investigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) is not
subject to a defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly found Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-l-19(a) constitutional when it does not provide any
constitutional protections for a defendant in a criminal
investigation.
Issue: Whether the court incorrectly interpreted the discovery
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it permitted
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the evidence gathered in civil discovery proceedings to be used in
a criminal case.
Issue: Whether the court incorrectly interpreted Article V Section
1 of the Utah State Constitution when it ruled that the grant of
authority to investigate criminal violations under Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-19 does not violate the constitutional principle of
separation of powers and that the statute is therefore
constitutional.
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fifth
Amendment and Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution when it
ruled that the use of the investigative powers of the Division of
Securities to obtain evidence to be used in criminal prosecution
did not violate the defendant's right against self incrimination
guaranteed by those constitutions.
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I §
24 of the Utah State Constitution when it held that Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-19 does not violate those constitutional provisions and
is therefore facially constitutional.
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fourth
Amendment Due Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 of the
Utah State Constitution when it ruled that the Division's
investigation did not need to comply with the requirements of the
Subpoena Powers Act or the Grand Jury Act.
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the parties'
stipulation, pursuant to which the defendants believed they gave
up the right to argue their Motion to Dismiss in exchange for the
state's agreement to accept the defendant's version of the facts,
when it ruled that there was no such agreement.
Standard of Review: With respect to the foregoing issues, a trial
court's conclusion that a statute or ordinance is constitutional presents a
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question of law reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. State v.
Lopes, 980 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1999)
Preservation: The foregoing issues were addressed in Terry's Motion
to Suppress., (R. 435) and his memorandum in support thereof. (R. 454)
Issue: Whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the
applicable provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act when it
held that, even without a referral of the case by the Securities
Division, the Utah County Attorney had the standing and
authority to investigate and prosecute defendants for violations of
the act.
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of statutes is a
question of law reviewed for correctness, e.g. Rushton v. Salt Lake County,
977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999).
Preservation: The foregoing issue was addressed in Terry's Motion to
Dismiss, (R. 98) and his memorandum in support thereof. (R. 203).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Addendum 1)
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Addendum 1)
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Addendum 2)
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 3)
Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 4)
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 4)
4

Article I Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 4)
Article V Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah (Addendum 5)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-10a-l-to 77-10a-20 (Addendum 6)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1 to 77-22-5 (Addendum 7)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13 (Addendum 8)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-18 (1) (Addendum 9)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (Addendum 10)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-21-21.5 (Addendum 11)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 (Addendum 12)
Utah R. Crim. P. 14 (Addendum 13)
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Chapter 12 (Addendum 14)
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Chapter 13 (Addendum 15)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about April 10,1998, the Utah County Attorney, purporting to
represent the State of Utah, charged Terry with 18 counts of Securities Fraud
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, 14 counts of
Communications Fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, 9
counts of Theft by a Fiduciary in violation of Utah code Ann. § 76-6-513, 6
counts of Issuing a Bad Check or Draft in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-505,1 count of Theft by Deception in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

405 and 76-6-412 and 1 count of Racketeering in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-10-1601.
Terry moved to dismiss the Information on the grounds that the
Director of the Division of Securities has the sole authority to enforce the
provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and that the Director did not
refer the case to the Utah County Attorney for prosecution, having obtained
the relief he sought in a civil securities fraud case against Terry.
The first hearing on the motion took place on September 25, 2000. (R.
0957, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, Addendum 16)
The Trial Court (Judge Lynn W. Davis) denied the motion to Dismiss.
(R. 318-334, Addendum 17)
The Court granted a second hearing on the motion. (Transcript of
Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, Addendum 18)
The Court again denied the motion. (R. 368, Addendum 19)
This Court denied Terry's Petition for Leave to file an Interlocutory
Appeal on this issue.
Based upon the State's representation that the facts of the case were
not in dispute, Terry filed a Motion to Suppress in which he alleged that
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 is unconstitutional for reasons which shall more
fully hereinafter appear.
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The State filed a Reply to the Motion to Suppress in which Terry's
version of the facts was disputed. Terry sought and obtained an Order for
Discovery to enable him to flesh out the facts on which he intended to rely in
support of his Motion to Suppress. The State failed to comply with the Order
for Discovery. Terry filed a Motion to Dismiss on that basis.
The Trial Court (Judge Ray M. Harding Jr.) held a hearing on
December 21, 2002, during which he considered the Motion to Dismiss and
the Motion to Suppress. (R. 0959, Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing,
Addendum 20)
Judge Harding denied the Motion to Suppress in his ruling of January
18, 2002. (R. 641-656, Addendum 21)
Terry filed a Motion to Make Additional Findings of Fact. (R. 685695) A hearing on the motion was held on April 24, 2002. (R. 0960,
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Make Additional Findings of Fact,
Addendum 22)
Judge Harding denied the motion in his ruling of April 25, 2002. (R.
845-846, Addendum 23)
Judge Harding was arrested for alleged drug possession and use soon
thereafter and the case was assigned to Judge Gary D. Stott.
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Terry filed a Motion for Review of all of Judge Harding's rulings on
the grounds that the Judge's use of Heroin and Cocaine during the time he
was considering the case severely impaired his cognitive abilities and that
the proceedings before Judge Harding would be so fundamentally unfair as
to violate Terry's due process rights under the Constitution of the State of
Utah and the United States.
Terry also asked the Court for leave to conduct discovery on the issue
of Judge Harding's use of Heroin and Cocaine during the time he presided
over the case.
The Trial Court (Judge Gary D. Stott), having declined to hold a
hearing on the matter, denied the Motion for Review and Terry's request for
leave to conduct discovery on Judge Harding's drug use in his ruling of
September 16, 2002. (R. 914-916, Addendum 24)
This Court denied Terry's Petition for Leave to File an Interlocutory
Appeal on the issues raised in the Motion to Suppress.
On October 25, 2002, Terry entered no contest pleas to and was
sentenced on six counts of Securities Fraud, three of which are Third Degree
Felonies and three of which are Second Degree Felonies. (Counts 1, 3, 4, 6,
8, and 10 of the Information) All other counts recited in the Information
were dismissed.
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As a condition of the Plea Bargain, Terry was permitted to appeal the
Trial Court's rulings on pretrial motions which he believes should have
resulted in the dismissal of the case against him.
On Terry's motion, and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the
Court entered an order staying execution of the sentence and certifying
probable cause that there are meritorious issues which should be decided by
the appellate court. (R. 0961-0968, Addendum 25)
The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on November 25, 2002.
(R. 953-954, Addendum 26)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. From May 17, 1993 to July 8, 1998, Mark J. Griffin (Griffin) was
the Director of the Division of securities of the Department of Commerce of
the State of Utah. (R. 156)
2. In March of 1995, Griffin authorized an investigation of Terry J.
Stephenson, Grant Mills, and Soft-One Corporation to determine if they had
violated the provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. (R. 155)
3. Based upon the findings of the investigation, Griffin referred the
case to the Utah Attorney GeneraPs Office to file a civil complaint. (R. 155,
133-152)

4. All of the issues in the civil case were resolved and settled pursuant
to the provisions of a Stipulation for Judgment and Permanent Injunction
and a Judgment and Permanent Injunction. (R. 155, 113-131)
5. Griffin testified that "I do not recall referring this case for criminal
prosecution of Terry J. Stephenson and Grant C. Mills." (R. 155)
6. Griffin testified further:
Q. When you did refer a case, did you send in written
communication? Well, what was the process for referral?
Verbal, written, how?
A. Usually it was the same process that is present in any County
or with any prosecutorial agency. You take your files down and
you screen the case with either the prosecutor of the day or
somebody who is a prosecutor that might specialize in the area.
As far as a formal letter of referral or paper trail from the
division, I did not institute that process in my administration.
Q. So there would be no correspondence in your file in any way
which had to reflect—or request to a prosecution agency?
A. I wouldn't rule that out, but there was no formal requirement
that we do that.
(R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Motions,
March 21, 2001, P. 9, Addendum 18)
7. The County Attorney asserted in the State's Response to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that "The Defendant claims that a client
relationship is established between the Division of Securities and the County
Attorney's office when a criminal charge is filed under this chapter. While
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there might be some legitimacy to that argument when the charge is filed at
the request of the director of the division, the di *ctor did not so request in
the present case. This matter was instituted after an investigation done by the
county attorney's office. There has never been a request from the division
that prosecution be pursued." (R. 206)
8. Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General with the Attorney
General's Office testified as follows:
Q. Okay. You talked about in general that when a case is
referred to your office you sit down with the representative
from the Division of Securities and you kind of brainstorm the
case, look at it and decide which action is appropriate to take; is
that correct?
A. Correct.
Would that include also consideration whether or not to file
criminal charges or the civil charges, is that kind of the thing
you are looking at?
A. That is a fair description. There may be situations where the
Division thinks that this ought to be prosecuted criminally and
we will say okay but here are some of the defenses and here is
how the case law reads for this and we think that a—that it may
be more difficult to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but we
feel very good about meeting the civil standard.
Or there may be other cases where they will bring up a case and
during the discussion with the agency we express the view that
we think this is appropriate for criminal prosecution and indeed
we would like to bring a criminal case.
Q. So the conclusion that being the course of action has been
then determined with the concurrence of both parties?
11

A. Well, we make an initial determination then and the
investigator is going to go back to her supervisor in the
Division of Securities and discuss it. I'm going to take it to my
supervisor. And then we proceed along that course drafting the
civil complaint letting the Division review it. But in the course
of putting it together, there are times we change our mind.
Q. Okay. And referring to this specific case, during the course
of the civil prosecution you didn't change your mind to change
it to a criminal prosecution?
A. How do I answer that without—without disclosing
confidences?
In discussing this case, the decision from—the initial decision
was made to bring it as a civil case and that determination did
not change. (R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on
Motions, March 21, 2001, P.29-31, Addendum 18)
9. Ellen Bloedel, an investigator for the Securities Division, had been
investigating Terry for almost two years before Douglas Witney, Bureau
Chief of the Investigation Division of the Utah County Attorney's Office,
began his investigation. (R. 202, 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing
on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 37, Addendum 18)
10. Douglas Witney testified:
Q. And if I understand your testimony correctly, what you are
saying -is it fair to say that this prosecution from your
standpoint is solely a determination by your office that to file a
criminal charge, the securities violations, your decision—you
didn't seek input? You got information from others, but the
decision was made by the Utah County Attorney's Office, is
that correct?
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A. Our office had filed security charges before this and various
other charges, so I would say that it was my decision along with
Craig Madsen, the prosecuting attorney, that he wanted a
certain amount of information set out and those were the
charges that we would pursue.
Q. And it didn't matter what the Division of Securities wanted
to do with the case, this was your case, correct?
A. It doesn't matter what another agency wants to do. If we
choose to file charges we will file. (R. 0958, Transcript of
Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 44-45,
Addendum 18)
11. Ellen Bloedel, an investigator for the Securities Division, shared
the evidence on which the Division relied in the civil case against Terry with
the Utah County Attorney's Office. (R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings,
Hearing on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 39, Addendum 18)
12. On or about April 10, 1998, the Utah County Attorney, purporting
to represent the State of Utah and the Utah Division of Securities, filed an
Information, which mirrored the complaint filed in the civil case, charging
Terry violations of the as outlined above.
13. The parties agreed that it if Terry were to prevail on his Motion to
Suppress, the State would not be able to proceed with the case. The parties
initially believed that the facts on which they intended to rely to brief the
Motion to Suppress were not in dispute. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on
Motion to Suppress, P. 3, 7 Addendum 20)
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14. The parties' briefs revealed profound disputes of fact in the case.
Terry offered the following facts in support of his Motion to Suppress and in
his Memorandum in Response to the State's Brief:
a. Stephenson, Mills and Soft-One Corporation were investigated by the
Utah Division of Securities for violations of the Securities Act.
b. The investigation was conducted by Ellen Bloedel a securities
compliance investigator with the Division.
c. The information obtained by Bloedel was obtained through the
powers authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 pursuant to which
she issued administrative subpoenas to produce documents and
records and subpoenas which compelled the attendance of
Stephenson, Mills, and others to testify under oath.
d. Based upon the information obtained by the division, at the request
of the Director, Mark Griffin, the Attorney general initiated a civil
complaint alleging a violation of the Securities act.
e. The civil complaint was based upon the information obtained by the
division, which included a substantial amount of documents,
records, and testimony provided by Stephenson, Mills and others
pursuant to the investigative powers of the Division.
14

f. The allegations of the civil complaint mirror the allegations of the
securities violations alleged in the criminal information filed in this
case.
g. The civil complaint, among other requests, sought the imposition of
contempt charges for each of the alleged violations of the securities
act.
h. Based upon the information provided by Stephenson and Mills and
the information obtained through the investigative powers of the
Division, a stipulation for judgment was entered into by the State
and Stephenson and Mills.
i. A judgment upon the stipulations of Stephenson and Mills was
entered by the court on March 23, 1997, in the case of Stephenson
and on April 16, 1997, in the case of Mills.
j.

Utah County filed a petition for the investigation of criminal
activities under the Subpoena Powers Act on March 24, 1997.

k. The information sought under the Subpoena Powers Act was based
upon information received from the division which was obtained
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19.
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1. The Utah County Attorneys' office did not file any copies of the
information obtained by use of the subpoenas nor summaries of the
results of the subpoenas.
m. The bulk, if not all, of the documents obtained in this investigation
relating to securities violations were either obtained directly by Ellen
Bloedel of the Securities Division, or obtained as a result of the
information provided by Bloedel to the Utah County investigators.
n. Michael Hines, Director of Enforcement of the Utah Division of
Securities submitted an affidavit in connection with earlier
proceedings indicating that the Division had both civil and criminal
enforcement in mind from the outset in the Division's investigation
of Stephenson and Mills. In Paragraph 6 of the affidavit he stated
that "It was always my intention that the Division would use a civil
case to obtain a quick permanent injunction, so as to minimize the
ongoing harm, and then follow up with a criminal prosecution of
Mills and Stephenson."
o. Judge Davis confirms this in his findings on the Motion to Dismiss
wherein he found that the Attorney General's office, through Deputy
Attorney General Wayne Klein, generally did not proceed with
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separate civil and criminal actions simultaneously because of the
potential intra-office evidentiary conflicts. (R. 569-572)
15. The State disputed the foregoing facts and recited its own version
of the facts.
a. The Utah County Attorneys' Office first learned of the current
allegations from David and Craig Smith, as well as Guy Pribill and
other concerned citizens, and investigated this case for several weeks
before making contact with the Utah Division of Securities.
b. Although the Utah Division of Securities did turn over records
obtained in the civil action, the majority of the documents obtained by
the Utah County Attorneys' Office were entirely independent of work
done by the Utah Division of Securities.
c. Mills was represented by counsel in the civil case.
d. Second, the Division has no "criminal investigators." The Division is
not a criminal agency of any kind; it is strictly an administrative
agency. So when defendants opine that a "criminal investigation may
be conducted and evidence of potential criminal violations
obtained..." they simply misunderstand the role of the division. The
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Division does not conduct criminal investigations and plainly did not
do so in this case. The record in this case clearly reflects the fact that
the Division was conducting an administrative and/or civil
investigation.
e. The point is that the UCAO had an active and independent
investigation under way before receiving any of these documents.
f. The defense disputes the number and nature of the administrative
subpoenas served on Stephenson and Mills. (R. 572-573)
16. Judge Harding's action on the fact dispute and the aftermath:
a. The Court entered an Order compelling compliance by October 12,
2001, with previous discovery requests submitted by Stephenson and
Mills.
b. Counsel for Stephenson and Mills associated attorney Francis J.
Nielson to review the records recited in the Order and he delivered the
Order to S. Anthony Taggart, Director, Division of Securities, on
October 5, 2001.
c. Taggart did not recall having been served with a Subpoena Duces
Tecum and advised that, other than a small folder, he did not have the
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records requested. He speculated that the records may have been
transferred to the Attorney General.
d. Notwithstanding Taggart's lapse of memory, he responded to the
Subpoena Duces Tecum on March 19, 2001.
e. The Order for Discovery was delivered to Wayne Klein, Assistant
Attorney General, on October 5, 2001.
f. Klein outlined his reasons why he would not permit Stephenson and
Mills to review any files of the Attorney General in a letter dated
October 9, 2001.
g. Access to the records of the Division of Securities and the Attorney
General was not given to Stephenson and Mills by October 12, 2001,
as ordered by the court or at all.
h. The Division of Securities and the Attorney General have not
explained to the Court why access to the records was not possible and
have filed no objections with the Court to any portion of the Order for
Discovery. (R. 587-589, 547-567)
16. Terry filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the States failure to
comply with the Discovery Order. (R. 569-594)
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17. A hearing on the Motion to Suppress and the Motion to Dismiss
were scheduled for December 21. 2001. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearings,
Addendum 20)
18. The parties and the Court addressed the Motion to Dismiss. The
Utah County Attorney objected to the hearing on the Motion to dismiss.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you prepared to argue the motion to dismiss
today? It wasn't really noticed today, but—
MR. WAYMENT: I am. I've told counsel I more or less (inaudible). I
object to it. The Court will remember we were here earlier on a plea
bargain.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. WAYMENT: An in terms of that plea bargain there was going to
be one motion that was going to be argued before this Court before
the plea and that was the motion to suppress.
I think that it's undisputed at this time that the Securities Division has
turned over whatever they've got. They didn't have much, and I think
it's not within either the spirit or the letter of the plea bargain to go
ahead with a motion to dismiss at this point, and frankly I've told Mr.
Carter I don't feel like I'm being dealt with in good faith to have this
extra motion brought up at this time.
THE, COURT: Have I provided anyone the -well, I did provide oral
argument on motions, is the way I termed it, didn't I?
MR. ESPLIN: Yeah, and that's the way - 1 did not (inaudible)
because that covered all the motions.
THE COURT: I'll hear both motions. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing
on Motion to Suppress, P.2-3, Addendum 20)
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19. Mr. Esplin advised the Court that the Utah County Attorney had
stipulated to the facts recited in the Motion to Suppress, that when the
State's brief was filed, the stipulation was not adhered to, that, instead, the
State claimed that the Utah County Attorney's Office had generated the bulk
of the evidence used to prosecute Terry, that many other disputed facts were
raised, that this dispute could not be resolved because the State would not
provide the documents as ordered and that unless the State would stipulate to
the facts recited in the Motion to Suppress, the hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss should proceed. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on Motion to
Suppress, P. 3-6, Addendum 20)
20. Mr. Esplin advised the Court of the condition on which he would
agree that a resolution of the Motion to Suppress would render the discovery
issue moot.
THE COURT: But as long as their position is consistent in terms of
the motion to suppress, you would agree that it's a moot issue as to
discovery at this point?
MR. ESPLIN: Yes, if they stipulate and agree that the investigation
materials primarily came either directly from the Division or as a
result of information provided by the Division through their
investigation and their subpoena. I think it is moot.
THE COURT: Would you agree with that, Mr. Carter?
MR. CARTER: I agree with that, yes. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing
on Motion to Suppress, P. 6, Addendum 20)
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21. The parties entered into a stipulation on this point.
THE COURT: And I guess that's the point with—let me ask you this
Mr. Esplin. If the State were to stipulate that for purposes—for all
purposes relating to the motion to suppress, that the granting of the
motion to suppress would be determinative to the case and would
prohibit the State from going forward, would that be sufficient for you
to withdraw your motion to dismiss?
MR. ESPLIN: Yes, I can stipulate to that.
THE COURT: Do you so stipulate?
MR. WAYMENT: Yes. I think it would be impossible for the State to
prove that the evidence we otherwise developed was truly
independent. I don't think we could carry that burden, and so we
couldn't really get past the fruit of the poisonous tree argument, and it
would be dispositive of the whole case, I think.
THE COURT: Then do you accept the stipulation on behalf ofMR. CARTER: I do. On behalf of Mr. Stephenson we agree.
THE COURT: All right. Then the motion—do you each agree, then,
that the motion to dismiss, would you like it withdrawn or rendered
moot?
MR.CARTER: I think it's probably determined moot based upon—
MR. ESPLIN: Based on the stipulation.
THE COURT: Moot based upon the stipulation?
MR. WAYMENT: That's fine.
THE COURT; All right, that's the stipulation. That will now be the
order as to the motion to dismiss. That having been disposed of, why
don't we now turn to the motion to suppress, and we'll hear your
arguments there. (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on Motion to
Suppress P. 7-8, Addendum 20)
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22. Judge Harding denied the Motion to Suppress in his written ruling
of January 18, 2002. (R. 641-656, Addendum 21)
23. Terry filed a document entitled Defendant's Argument
Referencing Contested Findings in which he requested the Court to make
additional findings of fact. (R. 686-695)
24. The State's Argument Referencing Contested Findings was filed
in reply. (R. 676-684)
25. Terry filed Defendant's Reply to State's Argument Referencing
Contested Findings. (816-839)
26. The Court held a hearing on the Defendant's Argument
Referencing Contested Findings on April 24, 2002. (R. 0960, Transcript of
Hearing on Defendant's Argument Referencing Contested Findings,
Addendum 22)
27. The Court denied the relief sought in his written ruling of April 25,
2002. (R. 845-846, Addendum 23)
28.Terry filed a Motion for Review and Reversal of the Honorable
Ray M. Harding Jr.' Rulings on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Motion to
Suppress, and Motion Requesting Findings of Fact, and for a Stay of All
Further Proceedings Pending a Disposition of the Motion.

Defendants also asked the Court for" leave to conduct discovery on
the issue of Judge Harding's alleged impairment at the time he considered
Defendants' motions." (R. 859-861)
A memorandum in support of the motion was filed with the motion.
(R. 864-883)
A lengthy Addendum containing all proceedings before Judge
Harding was filed with the motion and memorandum for consideration of the
successor judge, in this case, Judge Gary D. Scott. (R. 863)
29. The State filed its Opposition to Motion for Review. (R. 889-896)
30. Terry filed his Reply to State's Opposition to Motion for Review.
(R. 897-913)
31. Terry filed a Motion for Hearing on Defendants' Motion for
Review, for Consideration of Supplemental Documents Submitted in support
of Motion for Review and Objection to Ruling. (R. 917-937)
32. Judge Harding was arrested on Saturday, July 7, 2002, for alleged
drug possession and use and spent the weekend in the Toole County Jail.
Terry obtained the Court Docket, Search Warrant, Affidavit in Support of
and Request for Search warrant, Return of Search Warrant, and a Property
Report describing the items seized pursuant to the Search Warrant. He
attached these documents to his Motion for Hearing on Defendants' Motion
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for Review for consideration by Judge Harding's successor. (R. 917-932,
Addendum 27)
33. Judge Stott declined to grant a hearing on the Motion for Review,
and denied the motion in his written ruling of September 16, 2002. (R. 914916, Addendum 26)
34. This Appeal ensued. (R. 953-954, Addendum 24)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
Proceedings before Judge Harding, if he were under the influence
of, or materially impaired by, the use of cocaine and heroin,
would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process under
the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States?
On July 13, 2002, the Alpine/Highland Police Department and the
Utah County Sheriffs Department were asked to respond to Judge
Harding's residence in Highland Utah. The Utah County dispatch had
received a call from Ann Harding at 07:31 hours on that date in which she
stated that she needed help at her residence because her husband, Ray M.
Harding Jr., "had been using drugs all night long and that he was acting out
of her control."
When the officers arrived at the home, they found the judge standing
in the front door, staggering. One of the deputies stated that "Judge

2S

Harding's motor skills were very shaky and that he was unsteady on his
feet."
The Affidavit in support of and Request for Search warrant recites
that one of the Troopers observed: "poor balance, slow speech, and that with
the police presence currently there, Ray M. Harding has fallen asleep. All
these, according to trooper Jorgensen, are indicative of an individual under
the influence of a controlled substance."
This event occurred less than three months after Judge Harding ruled
on one of Terry's motions.
The science on the use of cocaine and heroin is well established. The
Court should take judicial notice that one is not only cognitively impaired at
the moment of use but for days, weeks and years thereafter. This issue was
raised in Terry's Memorandum in support of Motion for Review. (R. 882,
also see scientific articles on this issue, Addendum 28)
In Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), the Court
summed it when it opined, "Ones legal conscience simply recoils at the
shocking thought that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is satisfied by a judge presiding over a criminal trial and making life or death
sentencing decisions while under the influence of, or materially impaired by,
the use of an illegal mind-altering substance. Such proceedings before a
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mentally incompetent judge would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate
federal due process under the Constitution...
II.
The defendant is entitled to conduct discovery to determine the
scope, duration, extent and nature of the alleged use of cocaine
and heroin by Judge Harding when he was considering
Defendant's case and the extent to which he may have been
impaired at that time?
Terry asserted in the Trial Court that Judge Harding's intellectual and
cognitive abilities were compromised by his drug use when he was
considering his motions and that this impairment deprived him of a fair
opportunity to present his case. (R. 881)
Specifically, Terry and the State had an understanding that the State
would stipulate to the facts recited in his Motion to Suppress. On that basis,
Terry gave up the right to proceed with his Motion to Dismiss for discovery
violations. The State reneged on the agreement and Judge Harding refused to
enforce it even though the record was clear on that issue. He then proceeded
to find his own facts on which he based his denial of Terry's Motion to
Suppress.
Judge Harding entered a sweeping discovery order and then refused
to enforce it. He refused to permit Terry to clear up the disputes of fact in the
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case. A dark cloud of suspicion was left hanging over Judge Harding's head
because of his erratic rulings.
In support of his request to conduct discovery on Judge Harding's
drug use while he was considering Terry's case, he submitted the Court
Docket, Search Warrant, Affidavit in Support of and Request for Search
Warrant, Return of Search Warrant, and a Property Report describing the
items seized pursuant to the search Warrant to Judge Stott for his
consideration. Judge Stott summarily denied the request for discovery
stating it would be nothing but a "fishing expedition."
III.
The court incorrectly ruled that a criminal investigation pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) is not subject to a defendant's
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure.
The Supreme Court has recognized only two methods of investigating
a criminal case. One is authorized under the provisions of the grand jury
statutes. The second method is pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act.
The Subpoena Powers Act mandates that a district court objectively
determines that good cause has been shown for the investigation, that a
subpoena may be issued only after the investigating officer has made a good
faith determination that the evidence being sought is relevant to the
authorized investigation and that a person to whom a subpoena has been
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issued must be afforded an opportunity to challenge the subpoena prior to
compliance.
The evidence obtained by the Securities Division pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-19(1) (a) does not meet any of the conditions required by
the court.
IV.
The trial court incorrectly found Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a)
constitutional when it does not provide any constitutional
protections for a defendant in a criminal investigation.
The Supreme Court has held that the government's authority to
investigate criminal activity is subject to the Fourth Amendment rights of a
defendant or potential defendant. There are no Fourth Amendment
protections set forth in the Securities Act.
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-19 grants powers which are normally
restricted by judicial review and which are limited only by the investigator's
subjective determination, which is not subject to review, of relevancy.
The government is free to disregard all of the rights of potential
defendants under the Fourth Amendment if the evidence obtained in this
case is allowed to be used in this criminal prosecution.
V.
The court incorrectly interpreted the discovery provisions of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it permitted the evidence
90

gathered in civil discovery proceedings to be used in a criminal
case.
Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General with the attorney General's
Office testified in this case about the difficulties inherent in the process of
gathering evidence using the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which may be
used improperly to gain information for the criminal process. He opined that
information which is intended to be used in a criminal prosecution should be
obtained through criminal subpoenas.
He stated that it was not his practice to handle a criminal case and a
civil case against the same person at the same time.
He further stated that if the government is obtaining information
pursuant to civil discovery, or administrative subpoenas, and a criminal case
is ongoing, it raises the issue of whether or not there are parallel
proceedings. (R. 0958, P. 28-29, Addendum 18)
The evidence which was obtained in the civil investigation and later
used in the criminal case was obtained in violation of the defendants' rights
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. This evidence should be
suppressed as "fruit of the poisoned tree."
VI.
The court incorrectly interpreted Article V Section 1 of the Utah
State Constitution when it ruled that the grant of authority to
investigate criminal violations under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19
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does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of
powers and that the statute is therefore constitutional.
The core judicial function of review and control over subpoena
process as well as the judicial oversight of the criminal investigation
authority has been delegated by statute to the Division of Securities. This
delegation is unconstitutional and the statute should be declared
unconstitutional. All evidence obtained through the unconstitutional
delegation of judicial duties should be suppressed.
VII.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fifth Amendment and
Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution when it ruled that the use
of the investigative powers of the Division of Securities to obtain
evidence to be used in criminal prosecution did not violate the
defendant's right against self incrimination guaranteed by those
constitutions.
A citizen's right to the privilege against self-incrimination applies to
both civil and criminal investigations.
Terry's rights against self-incrimination were violated by compelling
him to provide documents and statements to the Division of Securities
without Miranda protection.
The subpoenas served on Terry which required his attendance and
production of documents to the Division of Securities did not indicate that
he was a "target" of the investigation.
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Based upon compliance with the subpoenas Terry provided
incriminatory statements, documents and other information which was used
in the civil proceeding and then turned over for use in this criminal matter.
VIII.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the
Utah State Constitution when it held that Utah Code Ann. § 61-119 does not violate those constitutional provisions and is therefore
facially constitutional.
The Supreme Court has held that persons investigated pursuant to
either the grand jury statutes or the Criminal Subpoena Act enjoy equal
protection of the law since both methods of investigation contain basically
equivalent safeguards against unwarranted prosecutorial misconduct or
intrusion.
In this case, those investigated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19
clearly denied equal protection since the act does not contain the
constitutional protections which both the grand jury system and the
subpoena powers system embody.
IX.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fourth Amendment
Due Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 of the Utah State
Constitution when it ruled that the Division's investigation did not
need to comply with the requirements of the Subpoena Powers
Act or the Grand Jury Act.
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Investigators from the Division of Securities need not show that there
is probable cause or to be able to articulate a suspicion before requiring a
person to produce private documents, physical evidence, or to appear and

testify.
The Division of Securities is given carte Blanche authority to compel
citizens to subject themselves to an investigation in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 is
both facially unconstitutional and is unconstitutional as applied in this case.
X.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the parties' stipulation,
pursuant to which the defendants believed they gave up the right
to argue their Motion to Dismiss in exchange for the state's
agreement to accept the defendant's version of the facts, when it
ruled that there was no such agreement
A Motion to suppress is fact sensitive and fact driven. The parties in
this case seemed to believe there were no disputes about the facts as they
related to Terry's Motion to Suppress and Terry proceeded accordingly.
The briefs submitted in support of the parties' various positions
revealed broad disagreements on the facts of the case. The Court recognized
this dilemma initially and entered a sweeping discovery order requiring the
State to produce documents which would clarify the dispute.

33

The State determined that they could not or would not comply with
the discovery order which was based on the State's failure to comply with a
subpoena issued pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 14. The documents, Terry
learned, had disappeared. Terry filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the
State's noncompliance.
Terry agreed to forego the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss if the
State would stipulate to the facts recited in the Motion to Suppress. The
stipulation was entered into in open court and the parties proceeded to argue
the Motion to Suppress.
Judge Harding ignored the stipulated facts in his decision on the
Motion to Suppress and generated his own findings of fact.
The record clearly reflects he erred in that regard and by doing so
deprived Terry of the opportunity proceed with a meritorious Motion to
Dismiss. The state had lost the documents described in the discovery order
and the case should have been dismissed.
XI.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the applicable provisions of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act when it held that, even without a
referral of the case by the Securities Division, the Utah County
Attorney had the standing and authority to investigate and
prosecute defendants for violations of the act.
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The Utah Uniform Securities Act mandates that the Director of the
Division of Securities shall be responsible for the administration and
enforcement of the act. He is authorized to conduct investigations to
determine whether any person has violated any provision of the Act.
The Act gives the Director the sole authority to make enforcement
decisions relating to civil or criminal remedies which may be available. He
must first determine whether he wishes to initiate a criminal prosecution. If
he determines to proceed with a criminal prosecution he may elect to refer
the matter to the Utah Attorney General or a County Attorney or District
Attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction who shall provide all legal services
for the Division and its staff.
The Utah County Attorney cannot investigate or prosecute violations
of the Securities unless he is specifically requested to do so by the Director
of the Division.
The Director of the Division of Securities did not refer this case to the
Utah County Attorney for a criminal investigation and prosecution. The
Utah County Attorney has no standing or authority to prosecute this case and
it should have been dismissed for that reason.
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ARGUMENT
I.
Proceedings before Judge Harding, if he were under the influence
of, or materially impaired by, the use of cocaine and heroin,
would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process under
the Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States?
Judge Harding was assigned to this case shortly after March 23, 2001.
He presided over the case until April 25, 2002, the date on which he handed
down his last decision.
The Judge's drug problems surfaced in a public way during the early
part of July, 2002. Terry asserted in the proceedings to review Judge
Harding's rulings that the Judge's demeanor, lack of concentration, his
physical appearance, his inability to follow oral arguments, among other
things while on the bench, were apparent well before July, 2002. (R. 910)
This Court recently stated in State v. Law, 2003 WL 21512555 (Utah
App.) that uAn appellate court's review is...limited to the evidence
contained in the record on appeal" (citation omitted)
The record on appeal in this case contains the Court Docket, Search
Warrant, Affidavit in Support of and Request for Search Warrant, Return of
Search Warrant, and a Property Report describing the items seized pursuant
to the Search Warrant, all of which was given to Jude Harding's successor
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for his consideration in connection with Terry's Motion for Review of Judge
Harding's rulings.
Forty items are described in the Property Report clearly showing
Judge Harding's drug use as of that date, less than three months after he
ruled in Terry's case.
Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), Summerlin v.
Stewart, 281 F.3d 836 (9 Cir.2002) addresses the impairment of a judge
caused by his use of marijuana during pretrial, trial, and sentencing
proceedings.
Warren Wesley Summerlin was convicted in 1982 in an Arizona
Superior Court for first degree murder and sexual assault and was sentenced
to death by Philip Marquardt, an Arizona Superior Court Judge. Following
affirmance of his convictions, Summerlin sought habeas corpus relief.
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied
relief, but issued a certificate of probable cause enabling Summerlin to
appeal.
Summerlin raised six issues on appeal, one of which was that the trial
judge's alleged use of and addiction to marijuana during pre-trial, trial, and
sentencing proceedings, as evidenced by the judge's admission of addiction
and felony conviction in 1991 of a marijuana crime, deprived Summerlin of

due process of law. Judge Marquardt pleaded guilty in 1991 in Arizona to a
felony involving a conspiracy to possess marijuana and admitted to suffering
from an addiction to the drug. This was his second conviction involving the
use of marijuana. Id. at P. 949.
In Summertin, the Court quoted Shakespeare:
He who the sword of heaven will bear
should be as holy as severe
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
MEASURE FOR MEASURE
Act 3, sc. 2
M a t P. 948
The Court in Summerlin cited two cases for the proposition that "due
process implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a
hearing." Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 32 S.Ct. 651, 56 L.Ed.
1038 (1912). (emphasis added) Tannery. United States, 483 U.S. at 110,
107 S.Ct. 2739.
We conclude from Jordan 9s and Tanner's articulations of a
defendant's right to a mentally competent tribunal that
Summerlin had a clearly established constitutional right in 1982
to have his trial presided over, and his sentence of life or death
determined by, a judge who was not under the influence of, or
materially impaired by, a mind-altering illegal substance such
as marijuana...
One's legal conscience simply recoils at the shocking thought
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
satisfied by a judge presiding over a criminal trial and making
life or death sentencing decisions while under the influence of,
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or materially impaired by, the use of an illegal mind-altering
substance. Such proceedings before a mentally incompetent
judge would be so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal
due process under the Constitution. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67
F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995). "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) Id at P. 950 and
951.
In Summerlin, a federal habeas action, the Court held that the
petitioner "is entitled as a matter of law to an evidentiary hearing on a claim
of constitutional deprivation if he can meet both parts of a two-prong test."
First the petitioner must tender a colorable allegation which, if
proved, would entitle him to relief, [citation omitted). ("To be
entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas action, the
petitioner must first make allegations which, if proved, would
entitle him to relief.")
Second, he must demonstrate that the facts are in dispute, and
that through no fault of his own, they were not adequately
developed for the record in the state court, [citation omitted]
("Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court to which a
habeas corpus petition is made must grant an evidentiary
hearing if the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in
a hearing in a state court, either at the time of trial or in a
collateral proceeding.") (emphasis added) [citations omitted]
(federal evidentiary hearing warranted where petitioner took all
steps to develop facts, but state court deprived him of the
opportunity to do so).
M a t P. 951
The court noted in Summerlin that the facts surrounding the matter
were never fully developed in state court. The court concluded "
Summerlin's specific and uncontroverted factual allegations against Judge
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Marquardt in the district court amount in the aggregate to a colorable
"reason to believe" that this defendant may have been deprived of his
constitutional right to a competent tribunal" and that "accordingly, this
showing entitled him to both funds to investigate this matter and to an
evidentiary hearing in order to develop the connection, if any, between the
judge's chronic use of illegal drugs, his alleged addiction, and his
performance during this case as a judge." Id. at P. 953.
The "reason to believe" standard sounds a lot like our probable cause
test used in preliminary hearings, justification for a search warrant, and
determining the appropriateness of bail.
The scathing dissent in Summerlin worried first that "we are opening
the floodgates to literally thousands of prisoners who will now tender thejudge-was-under-the-influence habeas claims against Judge Marquardt and
others and seek corresponding evidentiary hearings." Id. at P. 954.
"Second, our colleague claims we are ordering what amounts to
"rummaging" through Judge Marquardt's "private life" and that we are
unfairly condemning him to a future spent in "small, poorly lit rooms, giving
depositions about whether or not he was smoking pot in his office hours..."
Id at P. 954.
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Taking its lead from Bracy v. Gramley 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793,
138, L.Ed. 2d 97 (1997), the court respectfully disagreed.
In the main, we trust that with the evidentiary rules requiring
relevancy, the district court will be able in the exercise of its
discretion to keep the hearing focused on the judge's
performance of his official duties in connection with this trial
and this sentence. This said, we respectfully disagree with
Judge Kozinski's assertion that we are unleashing the furies
upon our justice system. We do not contemplate, nor should the
district court allow, a free-for-all foray into Judge Marquardt's
truly private behavior.
Id. at P. 954.
The court went on to say that "On the other hand, if the district court
should determine that Judge Marquardt was unimpaired and clear-headed,
the foul air surrounding this death sentence will have been cleared." Id. at P.
955.
Alexander Hamilton described our independent judiciary as
"the citadel of the public justice and the public security,"
calling judges the 'guardians of the Constitution." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). This pivotal role
was also described by Hamilton in that seminal work as the
"least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution"
because it has "not influence over either the sword or the
purse..." Id. But, if judges are bereft of those normal sources of
governmental power, what do they have at their disposal "to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the
law?" Id. "Judgment," said Hamilton, "merely Judgment..." Id.
The experts tell us that we can tolerate a certain number of
insignificant parts of arsenic in our drinking water and a certain
irreducible number of insect parts in our edible grain supplies,
but we need not, similarly tolerate a single drug addicted jurist
whose judgment is impaired, especially in a case involving life
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and death decisions. Neither should we put to death any
prisoner so condemned by such a wayward judge. Id. at P. 955.
"Certainly if it is a crime to drive a car while under the influence of
marijuana because the driver's judgment is impaired, we ought not permit
judges who are under the influence to decide if a person lives or dies."
(Barry Tarlow, National Association of Defense Lawyers article, August
2002)
II.
The defendant is entitled to conduct discovery to determine the
scope, duration, extent and nature of the alleged use of cocaine
and heroin by Judge Harding when he was considering
Defendant's case and the extent to which he may have been
impaired at that time?
In Terry's Reply to State's Opposition to Motion for Review, he
outlined the reason's why he is entitled to discovery and an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of Judge Harding's drug use while he was presiding
over his case. (R. 897-905)
The record on appeal reflects that Chief Justice Durham recited in the
administrative Order that the Court had "received information concerning
the arrest of Judge Ray Harding, Jr. and "exercising the inherent authority of
the Supreme Court to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary," ordered Judge Harding "suspended from presiding over any cases
or proceedings pending a determination of whether information will be
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forthcoming under Utah Code Ann. § 78-8-104 (Addendum 14) relating to
potential administrative leave for Judge Ray Harding, Jr."
Terry provided Judge Stott with the results of the search of the home
of Judge Harding.
The Utah Attorney General's Office now has a complete file on the
investigation of Judge Harding as does the Judicial Conduct Commission.
Terry should now be entitled to review these files to determine if they
contain evidence of drug use by the Judge during the time he was
considering Terry's case.
III.
The court incorrectly ruled that a criminal investigation pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a) is not subject to a defendant's
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment protects against the government's
unreasonable searches or seizures and against the arbitrary governmental
intrusion through the exercise of subpoena powers. Katz v, U.S. 389 U.S.
347.
The Supreme Court has recognized two alternative methods of
investigating a criminal case. One is authorized under the provisions of the
grand jury statutes, Utah Code Ann. §77-10a-l to 77~10a-20. The second
method is pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1
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to 11'-22-5. In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 754 P. 2d 633 (Utah
1998) at P. 657.
The court imposed restrictions upon investigations conducted under
the act in requiring the following conditions:
1. The overall investigation may be approved only after a district
court has made an objective determination that good cause has
been shown.
2. Each individual subpoena may be issued only after the
investigating office has made a good faith determination that
the testimony or other evidence being sought is reasonably
relevant to the authorized investigation.
3. A person to whom a subpoena has been issued must be afforded
an opportunity to challenge the subpoena at some time prior to
compliance. The authorizing court has the power to entertain
motions to quash any individual subpoena that does not meet an
objective standard of reasonableness when measured against the
good cause showing made in the application for investigation.
The investigative power of the Division of Securities, a part of the
executive branch, is subject to no objective review by a judicial entity as
required by the Supreme Court in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation.
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The use of evidence obtained by the Division of Securities under Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violatt Terry's right against unreasonable search and
seizure and should be suppressed.
IV.
The trial court incorrectly found Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-19(a)
constitutional when it does not provide any constitutional
protections for a defendant in a criminal investigation.
In Zissi v. State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 157 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court found that the Utah Stamp Act, which required persons in
possession of controlled substances to obtain a tax stamp through the tax
commission, was facially unconstitutional, because it required a person to
give evidence against himself which could subject the person to criminal
prosecution. However, the court ruled that the statute could be saved by
imposing a condition upon the use of the information obtained. The
condition imposed by the court was that prosecutors could not use any
information obtained by compliance with the Stamp Act in any prosecution.
Terry maintains that all evidence which was obtained by the Division
in the Division's civil investigation was obtained in violation of his rights to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure and should be suppressed as
"fruit of the poisoned tree."
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V.
The court incorrectly interpreted the discovery provisions of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it permitted the evidence
gathered in civil discovery proceedings to be used in a criminal
case.
The Attorney general' Office has eschewed parallel prosecutions of
the same person at the same time for civil and criminal matters. The
information obtained in civil discovery proceedings should not be used in a
criminal prosecution. This is one of the reasons the Division of Securities
elected not to commence a criminal case against Terry.
Wayne Klein, Assistant Attorney General with the Attorney General's
office was refreshingly forthcoming regarding this issue in his testimony at a
hearing on Terry's Motion to Dismiss on March 21, 2001.
Q. Okay. And referring to this specific case, during the course of the
civil prosecution you didn't change your mind to change it to a
criminal prosecution?
A. How do I answer that without—disclosing confidences?
In discussing this case, the decision from—the initial decision was
made to bring it as a civil case and that determination did not change>
(R. 0958, Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing of Motions, March 21,
2001, P. 29-31, Addendum 18)
VI.
The court incorrectly interpreted Article V Section 1 of the Utah
State Constitution when it ruled that the grant of authority to
investigate criminal violations under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19
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does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of
powers and that the statute is therefore constitutional.
Article V Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah prohibits
the legislative branch or the executive branch from taking over judicial
functions. The judicial function at issue is the review and enforcement of the
subpoena power. The power may not be wholly delegated to a non-judicial
officer to ensure that the judicial process is not abused. State v. Gallion, 572
P. 2d 683 (Utah 1997)
In the present case, the core judicial function of review and control
over the subpoena process as well as judicial oversight of the criminal
investigation authority has been delegated by statute to the Division of
Securities. Such a delegation is unconstitutional.
VII.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fifth Amendment and
Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution when it ruled that the use
of the investigative powers of the Division of Securities to obtain
evidence to be used in criminal prosecution did not violate the
defendant's right against self incrimination guaranteed by those
constitutions.
Defendants' right against self incrimination were violated by the use
of the investigative authority of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19. In the case of In
the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, supra, the Court ruled that a citizen's
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right to the privilege against self incrimination applies to both civil and
criminal investigations. At 633 P.2d 645, the Court noted:
Although both federal and Utah constitutions refer to the
availability of the privilege in the context of criminal cases,
under both the privilege has been held to be available in any
proceeding conducted by the government, civil or criminal,
investigatory or adjudicatory, so long as an answer might
incriminate the witness and a possibility exists that a criminal
action may be filed or a criminal conviction secured, (citations
omitted)
The use of the investigatory powers of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 to
obtain information which is used in a criminal prosecution clearly violates
the defendants' right against self incrimination and evidence obtained
thereby, including any derivative evidence, should be suppressed.
VIII.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the
Utah State Constitution when it held that Utah Code Ann. § 61-119 does not violate those constitutional provisions and is therefore
facially constitutional.
Utah code Ann. §61-1-19 violates the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the Utah State Constitution and
is therefore facially unconstitutional. It creates a system of investigation of
criminal activities which is separate from and unequal to those investigations
carried out under the grand jury statutes or the Criminal Subpoena Powers
Act.
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Those accused of crimes involving securities fraud who are
investigated by the Division of Securities as opposed to a County Attorney
or the Attorney General, are a class of citizens who are being denied equal
protection of law and uniform operation of law. United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114(1979)
IX.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the Fourth Amendment
Due Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 of the Utah State
Constitution when it ruled that the Division's investigation did not
need to comply with the requirements of the Subpoena Powers
Act or the Grand Jury Act.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates the Fourth Amendment Due
Process Clause and Article I §§ 7 & 14 by the issuance of compulsory
process without prior judicial process.
In US v. O'Conner, 118 F. Supp. 248, at 250-51 (D. Mass. 1953), the
court held that a government law enforcement agent could not circumvent
the grand jury by using a subpoena to compel a person to testify concerning
a possible criminal violation. It seems clear that the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-19 allow criminal investigators in the State of Utah to do just
that.
X.
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the parties5 stipulation,
pursuant to which the defendants believed they gave up the right
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to argue their Motion to Dismiss in exchange for the state's
agreement to accept the defendant's version of the facts, when it
ruled that there was no such agreement.
Oral argument on Terry's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of the
State's discovery violations and Motion to Suppress was scheduled for
December 21, 2001. Terry insisted that the State had agreed to accept his
version of the facts for purposes of the Motion to Suppress. The State
disagreed.
Judge Harding enunciated a stipulation to settle the dispute to which
the parties agreed on the record.
THE COURT: .. .let me ask you this Mr. Esplin. If the State were to
stipulate that for purposes—for all purposes relating to the motion to
suppress, that the granting of the motion to suppress would be
determinative to the case and would prohibit the State from going
forward, would that be sufficient for you to withdraw your motion to
dismiss? (Emphasis added) (R. 0959, Transcript of Hearing on Motion
to Suppress, P. 7, Addendum 20)
The language, "for all purposes relating to the motion to suppress", in
the context of the heated dispute about the facts, must be interpreted to mean
that the State had now agreed to accept the version of the facts recited in the
Motion to Suppress.
The State stipulated to the Defendants' version of the facts. The
Defendants gave up their right to argue the Motion to Dismiss. The State
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dodged a bullet on its discovery violations. The Defendants now had a
factual framework within which they could argue the Motion to Suppress.
Judge Harding then proceeded to ignore the stipulation of the parties
and found his own facts which he used in support of his ruling denying the
Motion to Suppress.
MR. CARTER: Well, maybe we misinterpreted that. The trouble-you do
reference "consistent in the terms of the motion to suppress," because we've
got this factual-THE COURT: I can tell you that's not what I meant. What you are implying
from that statement is not what the Court meant nor intended. I can tell you
that and I want that on the record.
MR CARTER: That's the way it was received, Judge. We have never had an
evidentiary hearing on this in any form. We kind of agreed, from our
understanding, of what the facts would be as set out in the motion to
suppress. Now we come here, and we're kind of lost because I don't know
where we're at on the facts. (R. 0960, Transcript of Hearing on Motion to
Find Additional Facts, P. 16-17, Addendum 22)
XL
The trial court incorrectly interpreted the applicable provisions of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act when it held that, even without a
referral of the case by the Securities Division, the Utah County
Attorney had the standing and authority to investigate and
prosecute defendants for violations of the act.
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-13 charges the Director of the Division of
Securities with the administration and enforcement of the Act.
The act authorizes and empowers the director to make enforcement
decisions relating to any civil or criminal remedies which may be available.
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If he determines to proceed with a criminal prosecution, he may elect to
refer the matter to the Utah Attorney General or a County Attorney or
District attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction who shall provide all legal
services for the Division and its staff. Utah Code Ann. § 61-21.5
The Utah County Attorney cannot investigate or prosecute violations
of the securities Act unless he is specifically requested to do so by the
Director of the Division.
Wayne Klein, assistant attorney General with the Attorney General's
Office testified that he consulted with the Division of Securities and that
they elected not to proceed with a criminal prosecution of Terry. (R. 0958,
Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Motions, March 21, 2001, P. 29-31,
Addendum 18)
The responsibilities and duties flowing from the client-lawyer
relationship attach only after the client has requested that the lawyer render
legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. (Addendum 28, Chapter
13, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct)
The criminal prosecution against terry should be dismissed on the
grounds that the Utah county Attorney had no authority to file the
Information in this matter or to prosecute this action. Therefore, the court
does not have jurisdiction over terry.
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CONCLUSION
There is enough information in the record on appeal, together with the
science available on the effects of drug use, of which the Court should take
judicial notice, to conclude that Judge Harding was under the influence of,
or materially impaired by, the use of cocaine and heroin during the time he
presided over Terry's case. The proceedings before Judge Harding were so
fundamentally unfair as to violate Terry's rights to due process under the
Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States for which the
appropriate remedy is to dismiss the case against him.
In the alternative, the Court should remand the case to the Trial Court
to give Terry an opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue of Judge
Harding's alleged use of drugs during the time he presided in the case.
The use of evidence obtained by the Division of Securities pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates Terry's right against unreasonable search
and seizure and should be suppressed.
The grant of authority to investigate criminal violations under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-19 violates the constitutional principle
of separation of powers and, therefore, the act is unconstitutional. All
evidence obtained through the unconstitutional delegation of judicial duties
should be suppressed.

The use of the investigative powers of the Division of Securities to
obtain evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution violated Terry's right
against self incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Article I
§12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Evidence obtained thereby,
including any derivative evidence, should be suppressed.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I § 24 of the Constitution of Utah and is
facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied in this case.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I
§§ 7 and 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. The Statute is both
facially unconstitutional and is unconstitutional as applied in this case. The
evidence obtained under the authority of that provision should be
suppressed.
DATED this 16th day of July, 2003.

Shelden R. Carter
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant,
Terry J. Stephenson
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